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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues 1
This memorandum identifies and examines the gender-related provisions of the
International Criminal Court’s (the “ICC”) Rome Statute (the “Statute”). The
memorandum begins by exploring the manner in which the term “gender” became
incorporated into the Statute. The bulk of the memorandum, however, is devoted to an
examination of the individual crimes. The elements of crime, negotiation history, and
relevant jurisprudence from other international tribunals are analyzed for each
enumerated crime in order to provide a comprehensive reference guide to the prosecution
of sexual violence within the ICC. The final section of the memorandum looks at the
gender-specific structural mechanisms unique to the ICC.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Nearly all of the gender-related provisions in the Rome Statute are unique to
the International Criminal Court and/or represent a reformulation of
previously non-codified law.
The Statute is the first international law treaty to recognize a broad spectrum of
gender-related violence. The Statute codifies the following crimes of sexual violence:
“rape, sexual slavery, trafficking, forced pregnancy, forced prostitution, enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence” as both crimes against humanity and
war crimes. 2 In addition, the Statute states that persecution against any identifiable group
or collectivity on the grounds of gender, if committed in connection with any other crime

1

Issue: How will the negotiation history of the Rome Conference and the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals aid the International Criminal Court in its interpretation of the gender-related provisions unique to
the Rome Statute?

2

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Arts. 7(1)(g); 8(2)(b)(xxii)
and 8(2)(e)(vi) (1998). [hereinafter Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

1

within the jurisdiction of the ICC, is a crime against humanity. 3 While some of these
crimes, namely rape, have been included in the statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) 4 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (the “ICTR”) 5 , neither have as expansive a list of the ICC. In
addition, for the first time the elements of each crime are specifically delineated in the
adjoining Elements of Crime Annex (the “EOC Annex”). 6 Finally, the Statute mandates
special protections for victims and witnesses of gender-related violence 7 ; allows their
participation in the proceedings 8 ; and authorizes reparations for such victims 9 . While the
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals carved out mechanisms for the protection of witnesses and
victims, the ICC is the first to explicitly acknowledge the rights of victims of sexualviolence, as well as authorize their participation in the proceedings.

3

Id. at art. 7(1)(h).

4

Statute for the Int’l Criminal Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., at srt. 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (1993), amended by UNSC Res. 1166, UN SCOR, 53rd Sess.,
3878th mtg. UN Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998), at art(5)(g) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4]

5

Statute for the Int’l Criminal Trib. For Rwanda, UNSC Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at
art 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994). [hereinafter ICTR Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 5]
6

Pursuant to Art. 9 of the Statute. The Elements of Crimes are published in the report of the first session of
the Assembly of States Parties: ICC-ASP/1/3, pp. 108-55 [hereinafter EOC Annex] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

7

Id. at art. 64(6)(e).

8

Id. at art 68(3).

9

Id. at art. 75.

2

2. The recent jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals will be able to assist the
International Criminal Court in much of its decision-making for many, but
not all of the gender-related crimes.
The EOC Annex is not intended to bind the ICC; rather, it is included to place less
of a burden on the judges in developing such standards on their own. 10 In addition, much
of the EOC Annex builds on the opinions of the other tribunals. Accordingly, the
decisions of the ad hoc tribunals with regards to sexual violence will be helpful to the
ICC. In particular, there is excellent precedent from both the ICTY and ICTR with
regards to the crime of rape, sexual slavery, and enforced prostitution. Some of the case
law, however, especially with regards to rape, might present something of a challenge to
the ICC because the elements of crime vary widely from court to court. The ICC should
consider the EOC Annex in conjunction with jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals in
its decision-making process. Other crimes, such as enforced sterilization, persecution of
gender, and enforced pregnancy find little basis in common law. For these crimes, the
EOC annex in combination with the negotiation history may play a larger role in the
ICC’s interpretation. It may be difficult for the ICC to consider case law from national
courts, since in many cases, the crimes of sexual and gender violence included in the
Statute and the EOC Annex are far more progressive than the definitions in the statutes of
national courts.

Andreas L. Paulus, Legalist Groundwork for the International Criminal Court: Commentaries on the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. OF INT’L L., 843, 848 (2003). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
10

3

3. The Negotiation process during both the Rome Conference and the Elements
of Crime Annex drafting may be an essential element of the Court’s
interpretation of many of the gender-related provisions.
In 1998, delegates from 161 countries, as well as various non-governmental
organizations (NGO’s) convened in Rome for a five-week diplomatic conference which
finalized the treaty that lead to the establishment of the ICC. 11 Six Preparatory
Commission (the “PrepCom”) sessions preceded the Diplomatic Conference to draft the
initial statute which was sent to Rome. 12 The NGO’s became a constant presence at the
PrepComs. 13 Of particular relevance to this memorandum is the participation of the
Women’s Caucus to Gender Justice (the “Caucus”) formed when it became apparent that
women’s issues were not being included in the discussions. 14 Feminist NGO’s from all
over the world worked together to push for the inclusion of gender crimes in the Statute
and create special protection measures for victims of sexual violence. 15

The negotiation process did not always run smoothly because the delegates had
unique and often differing perspectives on important issues. Many delegates had little
understanding of gender-related issues, and did not look favorably upon the inclusion of

Porter, Keith, The New Court, Courier Online, (Nov. 1998), available at
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/courier/articles/1998fall1.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 16]
11

Bedont, Barbara, Negotiating for an International Criminal Court, Peace Magazine, Sept-Oct 1998 at 21,
available at http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v14n5p21.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 12]

12

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

4

such provisions in the statute. 16 Of particular contention was the definition of “gender”
included in the Statute, the provision on forced pregnancy, and the definition of rape. 17
As a result, much of the language included in the statute appears to represent a
compromise between opposing factions at the Rome Conference (the “Conference”), with
the thrust ultimately favoring feminist groups and pro-women states. Because the EOC
Annex utilizes some vague language and is non-binding on the ICC, an examination of
the Negotiation process will prove fruitful in interpreting the Statute.

II. The Definition of Gender within the Statute
1. Introduction
The appearance of the term “gender” within the Statute in nine distinct places
represents a novel occurrence in international law. 18 The initial draft of the Statute
written by the International Law Commission did not contain the word “gender.” 19 Its
inclusion was the result of extensive negotiations between diverse and sometimes
opposing factions during the Conference. 20 The incorporation of the term resulted from a
substantial lobbying effort by women’s rights activists, primarily the Caucus, who

See e.g., Who's Obstructionist? Arabs Ask, Terraviva, (The Conference Daily Newspaper), (July 2,
1998), available at http://www.ips.org/icc/tv0207.htm [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
27]
16

See generally, CATE STEAINS, “GENDER ISSUES” IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (ED.) ROY S. LEE (1999) at 372-373. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 28]
17

See Valerie L. Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?, 55 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.432, 436
(2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
18

See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10 art. 20, at 70-73, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 6]
19

20

Oostervald, supra note 18, at 456. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

5

participated in both the Conference and the subsequent PrepComs which drafted the EOC
Annex and the Procedures for Rules and Evidence (the “PRE Annex”) for the ICC. 21 The
Caucus helped assure the support of the more liberal countries—Australia, Bosnia,
Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Netherlands, European countries generally, South
Africa for ten Southern African countries, and Sweden—for the inclusion of gender
within the Statute. 22 The Caucus and other like-minded individuals wanted to integrate a
gender perspective into the entire Statute primarily because gender-related crime has
been nearly invisible in world statutes and laws, 23 even though such crime has occurred
in nearly every society. 24
A. The inclusion of gender in the Non-discrimination clause
The term “gender” is included in two key areas within the Statute. The term is
explicitly referenced in the Statute’s non-discrimination clause. 25 Article 21(3) provides
that the application and interpretation of the law must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and be “without any adverse distinction founded on gender,
age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
Louise Chapelle, Finding Space for Women’s Interests: Developments at the UN Ad Hoc Tribunals and
the International Criminal Court, Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies
Association Conference University of Tasmania, Hobart (29 September – 1 October 2003) at 8
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 30]; see also Spees, Pam, Women’s Advocacy in the
Creation of the International Criminal Court: Changing the Landscapes of Justice and Power, Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2003 vol.28, no.4. [Reproduced in accompanyingnotebook at
Tab 7]
21

Jude Howell and Diane Mulligan, ed. Gender and Civil Society, Routledge, 2004. “Who is the Real Civil
Society? Women’s Groups versus Pro-Family Groups at the International Criminal Court Negotiations,” at
5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
22

Alda Facio, A Word (or Two) about Gender. THE INT’L CRIM. CT MONITOR 5 (November 1997).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17]
23

See ASKIN, KELLY, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS, 22 (1997) [Reproduced in part in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]
24

25

Statute, supra note 2, Article 21(3) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1]

6

or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.” The language is important because it
makes clear that the Statute’s regulations must apply equally, without regard to gender.
This clause ensures that all organs of the ICC, including judges, prosecutors,
investigators, registrars, and chambers treat all individuals fairly. The non-discrimination
clause not only benefits men and women, but victims and the accused as well. The
inclusion of “gender” along with the other protected classes, such as race and ethnicity,
was important because its exclusion might have been problematic for the ICC in
prosecuting such violence. The inclusion prevents any judges from applying the Statute’s
provisions indiscriminately. As such, the clause offers women and men, as well as
victims and witnesses an added layer of protection.
B. The statutory meaning of gender
The actual definition of “gender” appears in Article 7(3), under crimes against
humanity, and provides: “For the purpose of this statute, it is understood that the term
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term
‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.” The definition’s
somewhat strange language reflects a tug-of-war between the various delegates present
during the negotiations. 26 On the one hand, the Caucus and its supporters lobbied heavily
for gender’s inclusion in the Statute. On the other hand, vocal and opposing voices,
namely certain Arab States, the Holy See and several pro-family groups cautioned against
any use of the term. 27 Some pro-family groups advocated abandoning the term altogether,

26
27

Steains, supra note 17, at 376. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28]
See Howell & Mulligan, supra note 22, at 6. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]

7

while States such as the Holy See argued for a carefully worded definition that would
narrow the scope of the term’s meaning. 28
Interestingly, the main concern of the groups opposing the inclusion of “gender”
as a protected class was not that the term would be used to protect women, but that it
might be interpreted to include other groups. Some states were expressly hostile to the
term. 29 Many of the conservative delegates to the convention expressed concern that the
term could be interpreted to include sexual orientation.30 One of the pro-family groups
expressed concern that it might “provide protection for “other genders” including
homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals, transgendered, etc.” 31 As a result of such strong
opposition, the delegates gave thought to replacing the word “gender” with the word
“sex,” in an effort to prohibit any interpretation of “gender” as a social construction that
might encompass sexual orientation. 32 The Caucus opposed any such change,
specifically because the usage of “sex” would amount to a biological restriction of the
differences between men and women, whereas “gender” might incorporate sociallyconstructed differences between men and women. 33 To make its claim, the Caucus
produced documents establishing that the term gender was in general use throughout
28

See id.

29

The states that made statements opposing the term "gender" included: Qatar, Libya, Egypt, Venezuela,
Guatemala (but flexible), United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, Sudan, Bahrain,
Iran, Yemen, Brunei, and Oman. The delegates who led the negotiations for this group were from Syria and
Qatar.

30

See e.g., Oostervald, supra note 18, at 456. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

REAL Women of Canada. 1998. Canada Courts Disaster With World Court, REALity Newsletter,
(16/10 July/August). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33]

31

See , CYNTHIA ROTHSCHILD, WRITTEN OUT: HOW SEXUALITY IS USED TO ATTACK WOMEN’S
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United Nations documents and should be retained. 34 Eventually, a majority of delegates
sided with the Caucus that there was a need to retain the earlier definition, implicitly
recognizing the need for the sociological aspects of the term to be incorporated into the
Statute. 35
The PrepCom’s decision against replacing “gender” with “sex,” has received
mixed reviews from scholars. Some commentators have asserted that the definition of
gender within the statute is a direct reflection of Holy See and Arab fears that sexual
orientation would be read into the language. 36 Annex IV to the Beijing Platform for
Action, which was distributed to the delegates, states that for the purposes of that
document, the word “gender” was intended to be interpreted as it was in ordinary,
generally accepted usage. 37 Such a definition might have proved more in line with
feminist goals, as “gender” is typically understood as having more abstract a meaning
than the term “sex”.
In order to pacify those arguing for the term’s exclusion, the phrase “within the
context of society” was added to the definition, as well as the seemingly redundant final
sentence of the paragraph: “The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different

34
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from the above.” 38 Such a definition is unique to the ICC. It makes clear that the Statute
does not provide a universal and easily adoptable definition of gender. The wording
suggests that the definition of “gender” will vary from case to case. This may require an
ICC judge, in any given case, to examine the usage of the term within a particular society
before rendering a judgment, since there is no “universal” society of people. A
Scandinavian country, for example, might have a nuanced understanding of the word,
whereas an Arab country might view it as merely referring to “male” and “female”.
2. Conclusion
Many commentators have taken the view that the adopted language allows the
ICC a wide breadth of leeway in interpreting gender. Recent scholarship, for example,
has concluded that the statutory definition allows the ICC to “include persecution based
on sexual orientation” and “differing gender identities.” 39 One scholar, while
acknowledging that there is an argument for excluding sexual orientation from the
definition, concludes that because conceptions of “gender” and sexual orientation are
intertwined, and not easily separable, the terminology gives the ICC implied authority to
prosecute crimes against gays and lesbians, as well as other gender nonconformist
groups. 40 Other commentators, however, have asserted that the negotiation history, in
combination with the commonly accepted meaning of “gender” make it clear that the
word refers only to the two sexes and nothing else. 41 While the exact meaning of
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“gender” and what it shall include will ultimately rest with the ICC judges, its inclusion
marks a clear victory for women’s rights advocates who fought hard for its recognition in
the Statute. Furthermore, its inclusion “cleared the path for several other gender-related
provisions in the statute.” 42
II. Overarching Crimes falling under the Statute’s jurisdiction
1. Introduction
Before analyzing the elements of the individual crimes, it is necessary to explore
gender’s relation to the broader categories of crime included in the Statute. The Statute
gives the ICC broad jurisdiction over four major areas: (1) the crime of genocide; (2)
crimes against humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) the crime of aggression. 43 However,
gender-related violence is only explicitly included in the articles concerning crimes
against humanity and war crimes. The provision on genocide does not include sexual
violence and is defined as a list of prohibited acts, such as killing or causing serious
harm, committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group. 44 Hence, the exclusion of “gender” as a protected class indicates that the
ICC does not have jurisdiction over gender-related genocide. Accordingly, this
memorandum will examine sexual violence only in the context of crimes against
humanity and war crimes. While the specific elements of each crime included in the
EOC annex are nearly identical whether applied to war crimes or crimes against
humanity; the broader context of the crime determines whether it is tried as a crime
against humanity or war crime.
42
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2. The Role of the EOC Annex

After the adoption of the Statute, negotiations for the EOC Annex began in order
to provide more specificity as to the criminal conduct. 45 During the Conference, certain
states argued that a document elaborating the specific elements of each crime was
necessary for providing clarity and certainty to judges on the ICC. 46 The US, in
particular, insisted upon an EOC Annex. 47 Other states, however, were concerned that
such a document would place undue restrictions on the judges, limiting their discretion
over crimes. 48 Eventually, the PrepCom was charged under Resolution F of the Final Act
of the diplomatic conference with preparing a draft of the elements of crimes for
consideration and adoption by the Assembly of States Parties. 49 The PrepCom decided to
draft the specific material and mental elements for gender crimes essentially in the same
way for the war crimes under Art. 8(2)(b) in international armed conflicts and Art. 8(2)(e)
in non-international armed conflicts as well as crimes against humanity under Art. 7. 50
There are only minor variations in some provisions which will be explained as
appropriate.
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It is essential to understand the role of the EOC Annex before examining any of
the articles. Article 9 indicates that the EOC Annex is meant to “assist the Court in the
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 8.” This language indicates that, while
helpful to the ICC, the EOC annex is not meant to be authoritative. However, Article
21(a) of the Statute provides that “[t]he Court shall apply . . . (a) In the first place, this
Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence,’” perhaps an
indication that the EOC Annex should play an important role in the ICC’s analysis of
crimes. While the exact authoritative force of the EOC Annex is debatable, it is clear that
the elements appear to derive their sources in large part from existing case law.

3. Crimes Against Humanity

The Statute recognizes a wide variety of acts of sexual violence which qualify as
crimes against humanity. Article 7 on crimes against humanity begins with an
introductory paragraph stating: “For the purposes of this Statute, “crime against
humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.” 51 The Article enumerates a list of eleven acts constituting crimes against
humanity. This memo will focus solely on the substantial enumeration of gender-related
crimes listed as “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” 52 Article
7(1)(h) also lists “persecution” against any identifiable group or collectivity, including
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“gender” as a crime against humanity. In addition, the final crime in Article 7(1)(k)
refers to “other inhumane acts” indicating that the enumerated list is not meant to be
exhaustive. The only requirement for the “other inhumane acts” acts is that they be “of a
similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.” 53
A. Relation to Gender
The chapeau to crimes against humanity recognizes three specific elements that
must be present in a crime against humanity. The crime must be (1) “committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack”; (2) directed against any civilian population; and
(3) occur “with knowledge of the attack”. There are several things about the language of
the Article that will prove important to women and the prosecution of gender-related
violence. First, a crime against humanity is defined as any of the list of acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. The Article qualifies this
requirement in the definitional section, by asserting that the attack must be in pursuance
or in furtherance of a “State or organizational policy” and that there must be multiple
acts. 54 This language acknowledges that both state actors and private individuals may be
held liable for such acts. 55 These crimes can be committed by state agents or by persons
acting at their instigation or with their consent or acquiescence. 56 Crimes against
humanity can also be committed pursuant to policies of organizations, such as rebel
53
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54
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groups, which have no governmental connection. 57 The inclusion of this phrase
represents a desire of many of the delegates to incorporate the ICTY’s groundbreaking
decision in Tadic. 58 Hence the “State or organizational policy” language is a victory for
women because it indicates that prosecution of violence will not be limited to acts
furthered by the government. This is important because women are “most often the
victims of non-state, as opposed to state violence in civil society as well as war.” 59
Without Article 7(2)(a)’s clarification of the widespread or systematic requirement it
might have been difficult for the ICC to prosecute sexual violence when committed by a
non-state agency or rebel group.
Also important to women is the chapeau’s recognition that crimes against
humanity can be committed against a civilian population both in times of war, as well in
times of peace. 60 This is important because many crimes of sexual violence occur in
peacetime. Some of the conservative delegates were concerned that crimes against
humanity would apply not only to rape in war, but also to widespread or systemic sexual
and gender crimes in everyday life. 61 Accordingly, eleven Arab states sought explicitly
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to immunize rape, sexual slavery, and other sexual violence when committed in the
family or as part of religion, tradition, or culture. 62 In addition, a handful of states,
including China and a number of Middle Eastern states, argued that crimes against
humanity must be committed in the context of an international armed conflict. 63 The
PrepCom ultimately decided against these measures, making it clear that these acts are
prohibited whenever widespread or systematic and done by a state or non-state party,
during war or during peace. In doing so, the PrepCom has ensured greater protection of
women from sexual violence.
The closing phrase of the chapeau of Article 7(1) makes it clear that a person or
group of persons cannot be guilty of a crime against humanity absent the requisite mens
rea of knowledge. 64 Accordingly, an individual who participates in one of the
enumerated acts, but has no knowledge that it is part of a widespread or systematic attack
on a civilian population cannot be convicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity.
The exact degree of knowledge required by the Statute has been the subject of debate, but
one scholar has suggested that: “The perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have
knowledge of the connection between his or her act and the broader attack but need not
realize that the attack itself is the result of a policy. Nor must the perpetrator have any
detailed knowledge of the policy behind the attack.” 65 This requirement, however, has
disturbed some feminist scholars. One academic, for example, has noted that it has no
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foundation in the fifty-three year legislative history and customary usage of crimes
against humanity and that its inclusion may make it more difficult to prosecute such
crimes. 66 However, there are some limitations on this requirement. The EOC Annex, for
instance, does not require “that the perpetrator have knowledge of all characteristics of
the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization.” Thus,
while there must be some showing of knowledge, the requirement is not overly
burdensome. In addition, the negotiators agreed that the point is nearly moot because it is
difficult to conceive of a situation whereby an accused commits such an act as part of a
widespread or systematic attack, but can came to have been truly unaware of the attack. 67
Finally, it should be fairly easy for the ICC to infer knowledge from the surrounding
circumstances, even if such knowledge is not explicit. Accordingly, the mens rea
requirement may not prove as a big a burden to the prosecution of gender-related as some
scholars have suggested.
4. War Crimes
War Crimes are defined in Article 8 of the Statute, which begins by granting the
ICC jurisdiction over such crimes “in particular when committed as a part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” 68 The provision gives the
ICC jurisdiction over gender-related war crimes in international and internal war. 69 It
effectively repeats the list of sexual violence crimes contained in Article 7, with the
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addition of “…any other form of sexual violence also constituting” either “grave
breaches” or violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This is slightly
different than the crimes against humanity statute which punishes other forms of sexual
violence of a “comparable gravity” to the other enumerated forms of sexual violence.
Many scholars have called this a “watershed moment” because it is the first time that
sexual violence has been associated with grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.70
The war crimes article will prove important to the prosecution of gender-related
violence for several reasons. First, it expands significantly on the list of traditionally
accepted war crimes. The statute of the ICTY recognizes rape only as a crime against
humanity, but does not include it as a war crime. 71 The ICTR statute goes further, but
still has a limited enumeration of sexual violence under its war crime statute, recognizing
only “rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault” as outrages upon
personal dignity. 72
A. Relation to Gender
The Statute’s hefty list of sexual violence crimes is important because it removes
the moralistic element from the range of previously recognized war crimes. 73 Even more
important to women, however, is the fact that war crimes do not have the quantitative
dimension required by the widespread or systematic qualification of crimes against
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humanity. Whereas the ICC would be prohibited from prosecuting a single instance of
rape as a crime against humanity, Article 8 grants it the authority to prosecute such as a
war crime. 74 The chapeau of Article 8 provides that “The Court shall have jurisdiction
in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as a
part of a large scale commission of crime.” 75 While the inclusion of the phrase “in
particular” appears to suggest that there is a quantitative dimension to the war crimes
article, it is not necessarily indicative of such. The wording represents a compromise
between the delegates during the PrepCom concerning the jurisdiction of the ICC. 76
Certain delegates made it clear that they did not want the ICC to have jurisdiction over
isolated crimes. First, giving the ICC such jurisdiction might overburden its
capabilities. 77 Second, and more importantly, some delegates feared that it would subject
them to unwanted liability. 78 While, the vast majority of delegates supported having no
threshold requirement at all (i.e., completely deleting any requirement of a relation to
plan or policy), a minority faction argued for a high threshold for such crimes, by limiting
jurisdiction to “only” crimes which had been committed pursuant to a policy or plan. 79
Eventually, however, a compromise was reached whereby “in particular” was included to
appease the minority faction who wanted the ICC to have limited jurisdiction over such
crimes. Most commentators have concluded that the language should not be taken as any
74
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new restriction on the customary definition of war crimes, but rather as a technique to
limit the jurisdiction of the court.80 That is, the words “in particular” do not bar the ICC
from investigating and prosecuting single acts of violence as war crimes. In principle, the
ICC should be able to prosecute isolated acts of sexual violence as war crimes whether
committed in international or internal war.
IV. Enumerated Crimes of Sexual Violence Falling Under the ICC’s Jurisdiction
This portion of the memorandum is devoted to an examination of each
enumerated crime of sexual violence as defined in the Statute. Particular attention is
given to the negotiation history, elements of crime, as well as relevant jurisprudence of
each tribunal. The goal is to provide a framework for the ICC when faced with these
crimes in practice. The memorandum will not provide absolute conclusions, but will
highlight areas of importance and make conclusions on options that the ICC has in
interpreting such acts of violence.
1. Rape
Similar to the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, rape is codified in the Statute. The
ICC, however, significantly expands rape by including it as both a crime against
humanity and a war crime. 81 Because the two ad hoc tribunals did not have an EOC
Annex to aid them in defining the criminal elements of rape, the ICTY and ICTR were
forced to examine the crime in other world legal systems. In its examination of recent
jurisprudence, the ICC judges should be aware that rape has been interpreted differently
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by the two tribunals. The ICTY has been focused more on a detailed description of the
act, while the ICTR has relied less on such details.

A. Elements of Rape
i. Summary of elements
Rape is defined as the invasion of a person’s body by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator
with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body. The invasion must have been committed by force, or by threat of
force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by
taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a
person incapable of giving genuine consent. It is understood that a person may be
incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related
incapacity. 82
ii. Specific Provisions & Negotiations
Gender-neutrality. The definition of rape included in the Statute is genderneutral. According to the EOC Annex, both the perpetrator and the victim of rape can be
either male or female. Element 1 uses such gender-neutral language as “perpetrator” and
“person”, instead of the typical feminine pronouns included in many rape laws. In this
way, the statute acknowledges that men and boys can be victims of rape 83 and that
82
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women can act as the perpetrators of such violence. The Caucus and other groups
worked vigorously for this gender-neutral language. 84 In order to make certain that this
was clear in the Statute, the Caucus lobbied for a footnote to the word “invaded” in
element 1 of the crime, which reads, “The concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to be broad
enough to be gender-neutral.” 85 This is a groundbreaking development because older
definitions of rape confined its prosecution to a male aggressor upon a female victim,
causing some instances of rape to go unpunished.
Penetration. During the negotiations, the Caucus was particularly adamant that
the definition of rape focus on certain essential elements defined, in part, by the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. The first element makes clear that the crime of
rape involves “invas[ion]” of any part of the victim’s body with any “object” or “part of
the body”. It is not a requirement of the crime of rape that a man’s penis enter the genital
cavity of a woman. Instead, rape is defined broadly to include situations where someone
might use, say, a stick to penetrate a person’s anus. Furthermore, full penetration is not a
requirement; any invasion, “however slight” may constitute rape. This is an important
development because past definitions of rape required full penetration of a man’s sexual
organs on an unwilling woman. In addition, the usage of the phrase “part of the body”
indicates that oral penetration may constitute an act of rape.
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Coercion. The Caucus was adamant that the focus in rape be shifted away from
the victim, and onto the actions and intent of the perpetrator. 86 Accordingly, the second
element of the crime focuses on the “force, threat of force or coercion” that was used by
the perpetrator to instill “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power” in the victim. Thus, the Statute focuses on the force or coercion used by
the perpetrator, rather than the consent or lack of consent of the victim. The language is
worded carefully to make clear that the inquiry is not whether the victim felt fear, but
whether or not the perpetrator induced the person to be fearful. In addition, the Caucus
felt it important that the force element was defined broadly enough to encompass the nonphysical elements that are an important part of rape. 87 It is not necessary to show that the
perpetrator employed physical force to establish that rape occurred (as is the case in some
national jurisdictions); mental coercion will suffice.
Consent. In the same vein as coercion, the issue of consent emerged as a point of
contention during the negotiations. 88 The Caucus felt strongly that lack of consent
should not be an element because a person could consent without intension or be coerced
to do so. 89 Accordingly, the following footnote was included in the definition: “It is
understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by
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natural, induced or age-related incapacity.” 90 That is “a victim’s lack of consent is not
part of the elements. Rather, the perpetrator’s violation of a victim’s physical and
sexually autonomy is emphasized.” 91

B. Recent Jurisprudence on Rape

In general, the drafters of the EOC Annex utilized the ICTR and ICTY decisions
in The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija 92 and The Prosecutor v. Akayesu 93 to develop a
definition of rape for the ICC. 94 Drafting a definition for rape presented the PrepCom
with a difficult task because there is little case law on the subject, and the existing case
law varies widely in its definition of the crime. 95 Women’s rights groups worked
vigorously to produce a broad and progressive definition of rape in the Statute, 96 most
likely because they knew that crimes of mass rape are likely to come before the ICC.
The ICC is investigating mass rape situations in Darfur. 97
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i. The influence of the ICTY

The first element of the definition of rape in the EOC Annex, addressing invasion
and penetration, is based on the ICTY Trial Chamber’s definition of the crime in its 1999
Furundzija judgment. This judgment relied heavily on a detailed description of objects
and body parts in defining the act of rape. 98 The Trial Chamber looked to national
legislation and noted that an emerging State trend had begun to recognize acts once
considered less serious offenses, as being paramount to rape. 99 It noted that “the stigma
of rape now attaches to a growing category of sexual offenses, provided of course that
they meet certain requirements, chiefly that of sexual penetration.” 100 The Trial Chamber
also found that most states considered rape to be “the forcible sexual penetration of the
human body by the penis or the forcible insertion of any other object into either the
vagina or the anus” 101 (note the gender-specific terminology that most states use,
something the Statute’s drafters sought to avoid). It also noted that forced oral
penetration considered rape only in some states, was significantly “humiliating” and
“degrading” enough upon human dignity to qualify as rape. 102 In making the
determination, the Trial Chamber reasoned that the entire corpus of international law was
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the respect for human dignity. This principle meant that “such an extremely serious
sexual outrage as forced oral penetration should be classified as rape.” 103
Indeed, in the Prosecutor v. Kunarac, decided after the adoption of the EOC
Annex, the Court expressed concern that the Trial Court’s judgment in Furundzija was
too restrictive, stating that it “was more narrowly stated than is required by international
law.” 104 It felt Furundzija’s definition was too limiting because it required the relevant
act of penetration to be accompanied by coercion or force, reasoning that other factors
besides coercion or force could render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual.105
Accordingly, the Court defined rape as a violation of sexual autonomy, and held that such
autonomy was “violated wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to
it or is otherwise not a voluntary participant.” 106 The Appeals Chamber also provides
examples of coercive circumstances used by perpetrators, including detention in prisons,
military headquarters, detention centers and apartments maintained as soldiers’
residences, where there would be a presumption that the act was not voluntary or
consensual. 107

103

Id.

ICTY, Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and the Others, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-T,
para. 438. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52]

104

105

Id.

106

Id. at 393, 409.

ICTY, Appeals Chamber: Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (June 12, 2002) at
para.132. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53]

107

26

ii. The influence of the ICTR
Interestingly, element 2 of the crime of rape appears to be a codification of the
ICTR’s findings in the Akayesu case. In contrast, to Furundzija’s mechanical description
of rape, the ICTR’s Akayesu judgment takes a much more conceptualized view of the
crime and focuses on the element of coercion involved in such an act. Like the ICTY, the
ICTR in Akayesu looked to national jurisdictions and found no universal definition of
rape. 108 The Trial Chamber defines rape as “any act of a sexual nature, committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive.” It discounted the notion that there
needed to be a showing of physical force in order to demonstrate coercion. Instead, it
suggested that “[t]hreats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress” could
constitute coercion. 109 According to Akayesu, coercion is implicit in any environment of
armed conflict. 110 Thus, the ICTR’s definition leaves open a wider door for acts
constituting rape. In January 2000, the ICTR upheld this definition in the case of
Prosecutor v. Musema stating that “the essence of rape is not in the particular details of
the body parts and objects involved, but rather the aggression that is expressed in a sexual
manner under conditions of coercion.” 111 It is worth noting that in the Delalic case, the
ICTY judges reexamined the elements of rape and sided with the more open-ended
definition used by the ICTR. 112
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C. Conclusion
The EOC Annex of the ICC statute appears to take a middle road between the
Furundzija and Akayesu approach. On the one hand, the first element includes a detailed
description of body parts which must be involved in rape (adopted almost wholesale from
the Furundzija judgment). On the other hand, the second element focuses on the issues
of coercion and force. The ICC judges may decide to continue the trend of expanding
rape’s definition, by focusing on the element of coercion. Alternatively, they may adopt
the more restrictive standard of the Furundzija Court. However, a restrictive approach
would not be in line with the emerging trend of expansion. In addition, the language “a
variety of other specified circumstances” of element 2 appears to leave discretion with
the ICC to decide which accompanying circumstances might combine with a sexual act to
qualify as rape.
2. Forced Pregnancy
When faced with a case involving an allegation of forced pregnancy, the ICC
judges should consider that they are more bound by the statutory language, than is the
case with the other crimes. Unlike the other crimes, the definition of forced pregnancy is
included in both the Statute and the EOC Annex. This distinction is highly indicative of
intent to restrain the ICC in its interpretation of the crime because statutory language is
usually binding on a court. The main concern of the negotiators was that the provision
could be used to punish states for outlawing abortion. Accordingly, any such
interpretation is expressly prohibited. Most importantly, the ICC should ensure that
actual pregnancy, confinement, and intent to affect the ethnic population are present.
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A. Elements of Forced Pregnancy
i. Summary of elements
Forced pregnancy is defined as a perpetrator or third person committing the crime
of raping a woman with the intent of impregnating. Additionally, the perpetrator must
have confined or deprived the pregnant woman of liberty with the goal of preventing her
from ending the pregnancy. Finally, this crime must have the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of the population (of the victim) or carrying out other grave violations of
international law. 113
ii. Negotiations
The forced pregnancy article raised concern among many groups. Several
Catholic and Arab countries that outlaw abortion expressed fear that the crime of forced
pregnancy could be used to prosecute them for prohibiting abortion or be used to coerce
them into providing abortion services. 114 Pro-family groups sided with the Vatican,
arguing that it was an attempt to criminalize any denial to a right of abortion. 115
Accordingly, the Holy See and the Vatican demanded modification of the language, 116
while pro-family groups advocated abandoning it altogether. 117 The Holy See, for
example, initially proposed, and later tabled, replacing the term “forced pregnancy” with
113
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the more limited “forcible impregnation.” 118 Conservative delegates felt this would be
better because it emphasized that the criminality was in forcibly impregnating a woman,
as opposed to coercing the woman to carry the baby to full term. 119 On the opposing
side, states like Bosnia, Rwanda, and some Muslim states such as Azerbaijan and Turkey,
joined with various western states in trying to convince these conservative delegates that
it was not meant to force states into permitting abortion, but was necessary for punishing
the heinous and terrible crime. 120 In addition, they asserted that the phrase “forcible
impregnation” would not cover certain situations such as the one in Bosnia, where
women were raped and detained in order to force them to bear “Serb” babies. 121 Bosnia
issued a paper documenting the practice and calling for retention of enforced pregnancy
as a separate crime in the Statute. 122
After three weeks in Rome, an informal working group was formed to bring the
opposing groups closer together and try to define forced pregnancy in a mutually
satisfactory way. 123 In order to appease the dissenting conservative voices, the following
sentence was added to the definition of forced pregnancy: “This definition
shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.” 124
The second sentence was clearly inserted to protect the anti-abortion laws of the
objecting countries. Additionally, the phrase “intent to affect the ethnic composition” of
118
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the population was incorporated into the elements of crime to allay the fears of those
opposed to the incorporation of forced pregnancy into the statute.
iii. Specific Provisions
Forced pregnancy is the only act of sexual violence that is explicitly defined in
both the Statute and the EOC Annex. The definition contained in the actual Statute is
identical to the definition contained in the EOC Annex. Because it is defined in the
Statute itself, the definition is binding on the ICC. Three important features of the crime
of forced pregnancy present. First, the definition requires that the woman be physically
pregnant; the definition is not broad enough to cover attempts to make her pregnant. 125
Second, the woman must be detained or confined during the time she is pregnant. 126
Third, the crime incorporates a high internal intent requirement: the perpetrator must
bring about the forced pregnancy with the intent to affect the ethnic composition of a
population or to commit other grave violations of international law. 127 The legal harm in
forced pregnancy is that women are kept pregnant by means of confinement, violating
their rights to bodily integrity and privacy. 128 The effect of this condition is that these
women are forced to carry and give birth to babies of a different ethnic group, or that they
suffer inhuman treatment such as severe mental and bodily harm. 129
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B. Recent Jurisprudence
There appears to be little specific case law from any of the ad hoc tribunals that
explicitly examines the crime of forced pregnancy in a manner sufficient to help the ICC
interpret the statutory language. In dicta, the Akayesu Court noted that measures intended
to prevent births within the group would include such acts as sexual mutilation, the
practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of
marriages were prohibited under Article 2 of the ICTR statute. 130 The ICTR also
included deliberate impregnation in this list, if committed against a member of a
patriarchal society where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the
father. 131 In such a case, a woman of a particular group might be raped in order to
deliberately impregnate her with a child who would consequently not belong to its
mother’s group. Other bodies have addressed forced pregnancy, including the World
Health Organization, 132 Human Rights Watch, 133 and legal scholarship regarding access
to abortion. 134
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C. Conclusion
Without a doubt, Forced Pregnancy is the most contentious provision included in
the Statute. However, the contentious nature of the crime will be of little relevance to the
ICC. It seems absurd to assume that the ICC would have used the Statute to punish states
for criminalizing abortion. The mere inclusion of the article, however, will make it easier
for the ICC to punish such heinous crimes. This crime is more prevalent than it might
appear at first blush. It has occurred not only in Bosnia, but also in Yugoslavia where
women were forced to bear children of a different ethnicity. 135 Women were held in rape
camps and repeatedly raped until they became pregnant. 136 The inclusion of forced
pregnancy was a clear victory for the Caucus and other such groups. The intent of the
Caucus was not to impose sanctions on countries for disallowing abortions, but to
prosecute the abuse of women. As such, this provision was a win-win situation for
women and the ICC.
3. Sexual Slavery

In deciding if an act meets the criteria for sexual slavery, the ICC should be
particularly concerned with locating evidence of a commercial exchange. While the
Statute does not absolutely require a commercial transaction, the language and
negotiation history strongly imply that it is an important element. Interestingly, however,
past jurisprudence, found that a commercial transaction was not a requirement of sexual
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slavery. The ICC may wish to follow this past jurisprudence, instead of the EOC Annex
if it deems a commercial transaction unnecessary. The ICC should also look for evidence
of a perpetrator exerting absolute control over a person, and that at least one act of a
sexual nature occurred. Past jurisprudence indicates that an element of physical or
psychological control must be present in order to make a finding of sexual slavery.

A. Elements of Sexual Slavery

i. Summary of elements

Sexual slavery recognizes that the perpetrators may be two or more people with a
common criminal intent. The perpetrator exercises any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending
or bartering such a person or persons, or all of the above, or by imposing on them a
similar deprivation of liberty, such as forced work or by reducing a person to a servile
condition. This conduct includes trafficking in persons, in particular of women and
children. It also requires that the perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in
one or more acts of a sexual nature. 137

ii. Negotiations and specific provisions

The first element of the crime was influenced in large part by the definition of
slavery used in the 1926 Slavery Convention. 138 The 1926 Convention defines slavery as
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“the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised.” 139 The PrepCom, however, eventually decided that
this definition was outdated and narrow. 140 The Caucus, in particular, objected to a full
adoption of this definition because it required that women be treated as “chattel” 141 It
asserted that adopting the definition wholesale would be inconsistent with the definition
of Slavery in Article 7(2)(c) of the Statute, which did not require that the victim be
reduced to chattel. 142 The PrepCom eventually conceded that the two definitions of
enslavement and sexual slavery needed to be identical. 143

In order to simplify and clarify, the definition contains the following list in
element 1: “purchasing, selling, lending, or bartering” of a person might constitute sexual
slavery. This list, however, is meant to be non-exhaustive and other crimes might also
constitute sexual slavery. 144 Some delegations objected vehemently to this list because
they thought it might restrict the crime of sexual slavery to those specific enumerated
acts. 145 In particular, they objected because all of the enumerated acts carried with them
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commercial connotations, 146 noting that the Nuremberg Tribunal had characterized some
non-commercial situations as enslavement. 147 This broader approach was contested by
several delegations during the negotiations. 148 As a compromise, footnote 53 was added
on to the end of the Article. 149 The footnote states that in some situations “such
deprivation of liberty” might constitute “forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to
servile status…” The inclusion of the phrase “such as” before “purchasing, selling,
lending, or bartering” gives the ICC a degree of discretion in deciding which crimes fall
under the heading of sexual slavery. The primary focus, however, appears to be on a
commercial exchange, as these are the only situations included within the article itself (as
opposed to in the footnote). In addition, the language immediately following the
enumerated list indicates that other such “similar deprivations of liberty” may be
considered forms of sexual slavery. Accordingly, the emphasis is clearly on the
commercial trade aspects of the crime, rather than on the “slavery” aspect. The footnote
does indicate that the ICC may consider other non-commercial examples, but only in
“some situations.” A separate footnote states that the crime may be committed by more
than one person. 150 In other words, the deprivation of liberty can be committed by one
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person, and the sexual acts by another, such that both parties are responsible for the
single crime of sexual slavery. 151

B. Relevant Jurisprudence
Some additional guidance for the crime of sexual slavery might be found in the
ICTY judgment in the Kunarac and Others case where the Trial Chamber discussed the
elements of the crime against humanity of enslavement. 152 In the case, the ICTY
sentenced three ethnic Serbs to prison for their abuse of women at a “rape camp” near
Foca, a small Bosnian town southeast of Sarajevo. Among other things, the defendants
were charged with the crime of enslavement under the ICTY statute. This decision was
the first by an international tribunal to result in convictions for enslavement as a crime
against humanity. The Tribunal defined enslavement broadly as “a crime against
humanity in customary international law consist[ing] of the exercise of any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.” 153 Factors to be taken into
consideration in determining whether enslavement was committed included “control of
someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures
taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of
exclusivity , subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced
labour.” 154 Although two of the women who testified were sold as chattels by Radomir
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Kovac for 500 Deutsch Marks each, the Tribunal found that enslavement of the women
did not necessarily require the buying or selling of a human being.

C. Conclusion
Commentators have pointed out that the first element of the crime may lead to an
overly restrictive interpretation of slavery. 155 Indeed, the examples used to demonstrate
the types of activity that may amount to slavery are largely commercial in nature,
potentially limiting the scope of the crime unnecessarily. However, the ICC is free to
decide that in any case where women are recruited, transported, transferred, sold or
purchased in order to work in the sex industry, this amounts to a crime of sexual slavery
even absent a monetary exchange. ICTY jurisprudence may bolster such an assertion.

4. Enforced Prostitution
While similar to sexual slavery in many ways, the ICC should note that enforced
prostitution does not place as much emphasis on a commercial exchange. Although a
perpetrator’s expectation of an “advantage” is a requirement, it need not be monetary in
nature. While a sexual act is a requirement, the definition is broad, and may include acts
other than oral, vaginal, or anal sex. In addition, both the elements and the relevant
jurisprudence indicate that captivity or restriction of movement should be present.
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A. Elements of Enforced Prostitution

i. Summary of elements

Enforced prostitution is defined as a perpetrator causing one or more persons to
engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature, including any type of sexual act such as
nudity or masturbation. It is not limited to acts of penetration. Prostitution as a crime
against humanity is carried out by force or by threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of “violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
power,” against such person or third persons, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment or incapacity of a person or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
Additionally, the perpetrator or another person must have obtained or expected to obtain
some type of advantage, not only pecuniary, in exchange for or in connection to the acts
of a sexual nature. 156

ii. Negotiations

Of major controversy during the negotiations was distinguishing enforced
prostitution from the provisions on sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence.
The Caucus noted, for example, that the Special Reporter on System Rape, Sexual
Slavery and Slavery-Like Conditions During Armed Conflict noted in her June 1998
report, that nearly all situations termed “enforced prostitution” would amount to sexual
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slavery. 157 As such, it was difficult to convince some delegates that there was reason to
place enforced prostitution in a separate category. The Caucus expressed concern that if
enforced prostitution merged with sexual slavery, the latter would lose its separate
identity and unique elements within the statute, hence limiting the scope of sexual
slavery. 158 Accordingly, the Caucus set out to find a meaningful distinction between
sexual slavery and enforced prostitution: “Our considered suggestion at this point is that
the issue of enforced prostitution be dealt with by taking note of the problem that the term
has largely been used improperly in the past as a euphemism for sexual slavery and that
working out an appropriate definition should be taken up at the second round of
negotiations to permit more time for analysis and discussion.” 159 The main distinction
appears to be the lack of emphasis placed on the commercial exchange element which is
so integral to the definition for sexual slavery.

As was the case with sexual slavery, a point of particular contention was whether
the phrase “the perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary
advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature” was an
element of enforced prostitution or not. 160 Some delegates were opposed to making a
commercial transaction an element of the crime. 161 Eventually, the PrepCom agreed to
157
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allow such a commercial requirement, but compromised to adjoin it with the phrase: “or
other advantage”, 162 suggesting that enforced prostitution does not exist absent a
transaction of some sort.

B. Relevant Jurisprudence

While the ICTY and ICTR tribunals have not addressed the issue of enforced
prostitution in great deal, case law does exist to guide the ICC in its process of
interpretation. For example, Washio Awochi was tried by the Netherlands Temporary
Court-Martial at Batavia for forcing Dutch women into prostitution during the Japanese
occupation of Batavia. 163 The accused, which ran a club restaurant, was charged with
enforced prostitution and found guilty. 164 The acts rues was defined in Art. 1(7) of the
Statute Book Decree No. 44 of 1946 on War Crimes: “Abduction of girls and women for
the purpose of enforced prostitution.” The term “enforced” was specified as follows:
“[The women] had to take up residence in a part of the club shut off for that purpose and
from which they were not free to move.” If they wished to quit they “were threatened
with Kelpie (Japanese Military Police), which threats . . .were rightly considered as being
synonymous with ill-treatment, loss of liberty and worse.” 165 The threats were so serious
that they were “forced through them to give themselves to the Japanese visitors …against
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their will.” 166 Thus, the element of captivity will be an important consideration for the
ICC because it can be accomplished through non-physical means. The case suggests that
the women were “threatened,” but does not indicate that there was any physical violence.
Accordingly, the ICC may wish to interpret the element of “incapacity” in enforced
prostitution as being accomplished through psychological oppression or physical
violence.
C. Conclusion
While the extent to which forced pregnancy might arise in a modern context
remains unclear, it has been a significant crime in recent history. During World War II,
hundreds of thousands of mostly Asian women were tricked or otherwise coerced into
serving the Japanese army as prostitutes in the wartime brothels of Asia during the
Japanese occupation of Korea, China and other parts of South East Asia. 167 Forced into
sexual slavery by Japan and raped dozens of times daily by Japanese soldiers, the
euphemistically named “comfort women” have faced lives of enduring shame. 168
Accordingly, it is not inconceivable that the ICC will be faced with a similar situation.

5. Enforced Sterilization

This crime has come up most often in the context of experiments conducted by
the Nazi regime. The elements of crime show particular concern with the permanence of
the birth-control measures. That is, the ICC judges should look for evidence that a
perpetrator attempted to permanently alter the biological capacity of a woman or man,
166
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rather than just imposed a temporary restraint on a women’s ability to reproduce. The
ICC judges should also look for evidence that this was without the victim’s genuine
consent.

A. Elements of Enforced Sterilization

i. summary of elements

Enforced sterilization is defined as the perpetrator depriving one or more persons
of their biological reproductive capacity. The measure used must be illegitimate and
against the will of the person; the conduct must have been unjustified as a medical or
hospital treatment of the victim or victims concerned or carried out without their genuine
consent, which does not include consent obtained through deception. 169

ii. Negotiation History

Part of the difficulty in adopting this article was that some states were opposed to
the inclusion of any form of birth-control as enforced sterilization. China, in particular,
expressed concern over a footnote included in the provision, which initially read: “this
does not include birth control measures with short-term effects.” 170 China wanted to
ensure that the ICC did not have jurisdiction to affect its policy of population control.171
China proposed, and the PrepCom eventually accepted, the phrase “non-permanent”
instead of “short-term.” Thus, in the final draft the footnote reads “does not include birth
169
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control measures with non-permanent effects in practice,” largely as a result of China’s
objection to the possibility that the provision could be read to imply that every form of
birth control might amount to enforced sterilization. The footnote indicates that
temporary birth control methods that do not remain in effect throughout the life of the
person are not covered by this type of crime (even if they are imposed in an obligatory
manner without the consent of the victim). While birth control measures with a “nonpermanent effect in practice” would not qualify as enforced sterilization, repeated shortterm birth control measures, which would heave a permanent effect in practice would be
covered by the adopted wording. 172

The issue of consent also became proved troublesome during the negotiations.
The Caucus was worried that “consent” was to loose a term. 173 In particular, the Caucus
wanted to make clear that the consent must be genuine (i.e., that someone could not be
tricked into consenting). Some delegations argued that “genuine consent” should be
replaced with “voluntary and informed consent” to avoid the possibility that someone
could be tricked into consenting. 174 Accordingly, a footnote indicating that “genuine
consent” for this crime does not include consent obtained through deception appears in
the final draft.

B. Relevant Jurisprudence
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The ad hoc tribunals have not examined the material elements of enforced
sterilization in any great depth. However, the issue has been addressed in some postSecond World War trials in the context of medical experiments,175 although the elements
of crime have never been made explicit or even examined in depth. Accordingly, the
ICC should rely on the EOC Annex, as well as the negotiation history in interpreting this
crime.

C. Conclusion

While the crime of enforced sterilization may not be as pressing an issue as that of
rape or sexual slavery, it is important that such conduct is outlawed in an international
document such as the Statute. Clearly, the drafters did not intend to criminalize the
conduct of countries like China, which has a national policy of birth control. The crime is
meant to punish those who have deprived a person of his/her reproductive capacity.

6. Other forms of Sexual Violence

In examining the crime of other forms of sexual violence, the ICC should be
aware that this is the one crime of sexual violence defined differently by the EOC Annex
as it applies to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The inclusion of the crime is
important because it ensures that the ICC is not limited in its jurisdiction over crimes of
sexual violence. Any non-enumerated crime of sexual violence that meets the criteria for
this crime will fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction.
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A. Elements of Other Forms of Sexual Violence

i. summary of elements

Any other form of sexual violence is defined as the perpetrator committing an act
of a sexual nature against one or more persons or causing such person or persons to
engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
power, against the victim or third persons, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment or such person or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. Also, such
conduct must be of comparable gravity to other crimes indicated in Article 7(1)(g) of the
Statute, if constituting a crime against humanity, or be of comparable gravity to a grave
violation of the Geneva Conventions, if constituting a war crime. 176

ii. Negotiations

The first element of the crime indicates two different situations for this broad
provision. The first includes situations where the perpetrator him/herself committed a
sexual act against the victim; the second for when the perpetrator forces or coerces the
victim to perform sexual acts. Otherwise, it is similar in scope to the definition of other
crimes, such as rape, in that the aggressor use “force” “threat of force” or “ coercion” to
arouse fear in the victim in order to accomplish sexual violence.

It is essential to note that the elements are slightly different for the crime to be
prosecuted as a crime against humanity than they are for a war crime. The EOC Annex
176
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specifies that for crimes against humanity, the conduct must be comparable to the other
crimes of sexual violence listed in the Statute. That is, it must be on par with rape,
enforced prostitution, and sexual slavery to be considered an “other form of sexual
violence.” In the context of war crimes, it need be comparable to that of a “grave breach
of the Geneva Convention.” Considerable debates took place with regard to the war
crime of sexual violence. While some delegations argued that this formulation was
intended only to indicate that gender crimes could already be prosecuted as grave
breaches, others thought that the conduct must constitute one of the crimes defined in Art.
8(2)(a) –the specifically named grave breaches of the Geneva Convention – and in
addition involve violent acts of a sexual nature. 177 The majority of delegates, however,
felt that the statutory formulation was meant to indicate the seriousness of the crime, and
not as a factor requiring it also to be a grave breach listed in Art. 8(2)(a). 178 Some
commentators have suggested that examples of crimes that might meet the criterion for
this category are forced nudity and sexual mutilation.

B. Relevant jurisprudence

The ICTY and ICTR have convicted perpetrators of acts of sexual violence such
as forced nudity 179 and sexual mutilation, 180 under the heading of crime against
“inhumane treatment.” The elements of the crimes of forced nudity and sexual mutilation
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focus on situations where the perpetrator commits sexual acts against the victim and
where the perpetrator caused the victim by force, threat of force or coercion to perform
sexual acts. 181 In Akayesu, the ICTR held that:
Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body
and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical
contact. . . The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances
need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation,
extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation
may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances,
such as armed conflict or the military presence. 182
Accordingly, this crime has been used to cover situations where there is no physical
contact, but where “threats” and other coercive circumstances were present. As such, this
crime may cover a broad scope of situations.
C. Conclusion

When states have defined sexual violence as crimes against humanity and war
crimes under national law, they have sometimes criminalized only rape and excluded
other forms of sexual violence.183 The inclusion of other forms of sexual violence as
crimes against humanity and war crimes will allow the ICC to prosecute situations where
there is no overt act of sexual violence, but where a person’s sexual autonomy has still
been violated. The provision serves to broaden the ICC’s jurisdiction and is a significant
victory for women.
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6. Persecution based on gender

The inclusion of persecution based on gender in the Statute is an explicit
recognition that women may be subject to persecution as a class in the same way that
racial and ethnic groups have been throughout history. As is the case with the definition
of “gender” (as discussed above), the ICC’s most important decision in interpreting the
language will be deciding whether or not the meaning of “gender” can be expanded to
include persecution towards gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered people.

A. Elements of Persecution

i. summary of elements

Persecution is classified only as a crime against humanity and is defined as the
perpetrator targeting a person or persons by reason of their membership in a group or
collectivity or targeting the group or collectivity as such, including not only politically,
racially, nationally, ethnically, culturally, and religious based persecution, but also
persecution for reason of gender. 184

ii. Negotiations

The biggest concern about this provision was related to the definition of gender.
Many conservative delegates feared the term “gender persecution” could be interpreted to
include persecution over “gender nonconformist” groups or gays and lesbians (this is
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discussed earlier in the memorandum, and will not be repeated here). 185 The definition of
persecution adopted makes clear that a denial of human rights is a requirement for this
crime. However, not every denial of human rights of women constitutes persecution on
the basis of gender. Some states were concerned that the crime of persecution was too
vague, and might be interpreted to include institutionalized discrimination. 186 In order to
placate these states, the fourth element was added to the Statute. 187 This element requires
persecution to be connected with another serious crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Persecution as a crime against humanity normally exists independently of any other
crime, and this has been recognized by many other legal bodies, including the ICTR and
ICTY. 188 The fourth element, however, makes clear that this will not be the case in the
ICC. Persecution based on gender alone does not constitute a crime within the ICC.
Persecution based on gender does not need to result in physical harm. Element 1
indicates that a persons must be deprived of their fundamental rights, but does not
indicate that they must be subject to any physical harm. Accordingly, acts of mental,
social, or economic harm could potentially qualify as an act of persecution.

B. Recent jurisprudence
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While racial persecution is included in the statutes of many tribunals, there
appears to be little or no case law on the specific issue of gender persecution in any of the
tribunals or international legal bodies.

C. Conclusion

Previous definitions of persecution tended to focus not on gender, but on race,
ethnicity, or nationality. 189 Thus, the inclusion of gender emerges as a result of a
growing recognition that women may be subject to persecution as a class. It may be
important for the ICC to consider an expansive definition of gender in interpreting the
Statute, as gays as a class are often subject to persecution. 190 However, the ICC may be
ultimately restricted in its jurisdiction over this crime, due to the nexus requirement of the
fourth element.

III. Structural Mechanisms for Victims and Witnesses

Apart from the various provisions recognizing gender-related crimes, the Statute
also provides special protections for victims and witnesses of gender-related violence.
Ensuring proper, gender-sensitive treatment of victims and witnesses was one of the main
concerns of many governments and NGOs during the Conference. 191 The Statute
recognizes three important principles with regards to victims and witnesses: victim
A Widney Brown & Laura Grenfell, The international crime of gender-based persecution and the
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participation in the proceedings, protection of victims and witnesses and the right to
reparations. This is particularly important for women, who may come from countries
where crimes of sexual violence render a woman impure and have potential to ostracize
her from her community (or worse). Without built-in mechanisms to protect and enable
these women, it would be nearly impossible to prosecute many acts of sexual violence.
A. Protection
The statutory language indicates that the organs of the ICC should take proactive
measures to provide for the care of victims, rather than just utilizing them for evidentiary
purposes and then ushering them back into their environment. Accordingly, the ICC
assumes some responsibility for both the trauma of testifying, as well as the trauma of the
sexual violence itself. The Statutory language is carefully worded to ensure that victims
are not lost in the process.
Article 43(6) provides for the establishment of a Victims and Witnesses Unit in
the ICC’s registry. Article 43(6) also requires that the Unit have staff with expertise in
trauma related to crimes of sexual violence available at all times. 192 It will provide
protective measures, security arrangements, counseling and “other appropriate
assistance” to victims, witnesses “who appear before the Court.” 193 The Unit will not
take a passive role in the ICC process: Article 68 (4) authorizes the Unit to advise the
Prosecutor and the rest of the ICC on measures related to sexual violence.
It will be important to note that these protective measures are not limited to the
proceedings, as the language might indicate. Article 34 indicates that “the Court” is
192
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composed of: “(a) the Presidency; (b) an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a PreTrial Division; (c) the Office of the Prosecutor; and (d) the Registry.” Therefore, victims
and witnesses are entitled to protections during all stages. In addition, Article 43(6)
indicates that the ICC must offer such protections to “others at risk.” Accordingly, the
Statute protects family members and other dependants, in addition to the victims.
B. Participation
Article 68 allows victims and witnesses to participate in ICC proceedings during
important stages. First it should be noted that victims and witnesses are entitled to legal
assistance throughout the proceedings. 194 Article 68(3) allows for their views and
concerns to be presented to the ICC “when appropriate,” as long as they are not
“prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.” Victims have the right to
apply to the Registrar in order to be admitted as participants in a given process. 195
Victim participation will be allowed under three circumstances:
(1) There is a personal interest of the victim to intervene in the proceedings,
(2) There is no threat to the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial, and
(3) Opportunities shall be provided at appropriate stages of the proceedings for the
views and concerns of the victim to be presented and considered. 196

Victims shall be assisted in the proceedings by legal representatives who can pursue the
best interests of the victims. 197 Rule 92 specifies that victims and their legal
representatives must be notified of important procedural developments in their case. In
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addition, Rules 91 and 93 allow a victim’s legal representative to make timely
interventions on behalf of the victims, including the possibility of making opening and
closing statements and posing questions to witnesses.
C. Reparations
Article 75 of the Statute authorized the ICC to establish methods for reparations
to victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 198 The ICC is
authorized to determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to victims,
and is bound to state the principles upon which it is acting. 199 Rules 94 to 99 establish the
procedures for making reparations to victims. The ICC may order a convicted person to
pay fines to a victim. 200 Alternatively, the funds can be paid directly from a Trust Fund
(established in Art 79) established for the benefit of the victims and their families by the
ICC. 201 In general the ICC should consider such motions for compensation only upon
request. 202 However, the ICC may order such reparations to be paid upon its own motion
in “exceptional” circumstances. 203

IV. CONCLUSION
The ICC stands at a unique place in history because it has the power to set
important precedent relating to crimes of sexual violence for years to come. The ICC
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essentially has three sources to draw from in making decisions regarding sexual violence:
the EOC Annex, the negotiation history, and the precedent from other tribunals. While
the use of any of these sources will prove fruitful to the ICC, none are dispositive or
authoritative. The judges may pick and choose whatever they feel will be most beneficial
to their interpretation.
The ICC will likely be examining some of the crimes discussed in this
memorandum in the near future. ICC prosecutors have already begun investigating the
crimes being alleged in Darfur, which include allegations of mass rape. 204 It will be
important for the ICC to bear in mind that the Statute was drafted by nearly one hundred
and sixty states, as well as a wide variety of NGO’s and special interest groups.
Accordingly, the final version represents a compromise among groups with opposing
viewpoints and perspectives. In terms of “gender”, however, it appears that feminist
groups and their supporters were often victorious in persuading the PrepCom to adopt
their perspective. As such, the ICC is free to take an expansive view of gender-specific
provisions interpreting vague language with an eye towards feminist concerns.
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